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UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
aFrican regional &  
Sub-regional SySteMS
aFrican coMMiSSion recognizeS tHe 
darFurianS aS a people
A decision released in July 2010 by the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights is the latest in the Commission’s 
attempts over several decades to address 
widespread human rights violations in the 
Southern and Darfur regions of Sudan. In 
a 1999 decision, the Commission found the 
government of Sudan had committed wide-
spread human rights violations throughout 
Sudan between 1989 and 1993. In 2005, the 
Commission passed a resolution urging the 
government to comply with its obligations 
under international agreements, including 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 
the United Nations Charter, and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and 
to desist from attacks against the Darfurian 
people. The latest decision once again finds 
widespread violations and, most signifi-
cantly, expands the jurisprudence on Sudan 
by recognizing Darfurians as a people with 
standing to claim collective rights under the 
African Charter.
The Center on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE), a Geneva-based inter-
national NGO, filed its communication 
with the Commission in 2003 against the 
government of Sudan for mass violations 
of the African Charter. In that year, armed 
groups including the Sudan Liberation 
Army/Movement and the Justice and 
Equality Movement, rebelled against the 
government of Sudan, reacting to its mar-
ginalization and underdevelopment of the 
Darfur region. The government of Sudan 
suppressed the uprising by sponsoring 
the Murhaleen and Janjaweed militias, 
which have targeted civilian populations, 
destroyed and contaminated water wells, 
and forcibly evicted thousands by raz-
ing homes and entire villages, leading to 
mass displacement. Based on these actions, 
COHRE alleged that the government of 
Sudan violated Articles 4-7, 12, 14, 16, 18, 
and 22 of the African Charter. These arti-
cles include, respectively, the general duty 
of member states to recognize the Charter 
rights and give them effect in domestic 
legislation, as well as the specific rights to 
life and integrity of person; to dignity; to 
liberty and security of person; to be heard; 
to freedom of movement and residence 
within a state; to property; to family, oblig-
ing the state to protect the family’s physical 
and moral health; and to economic, social, 
and cultural (ESC) development.
The government of Sudan protested 
the admissibility of the communication 
for failure to exhaust local remedies. The 
Commission, however, agreed with the 
petitioner’s assertion that because the gov-
ernment is aware of widespread human 
rights violations but provides no recourse, 
local remedies are “unavailable, inef-
fective and insufficient,” and found the 
Communication admissible.  On the merits 
of the communication, Sudan denied the 
allegations, blaming the Darfur situation 
largely on the instability and interference 
of neighboring states such as Chad and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Sudan 
claimed that through the Darfur Peace 
Agreement of May 2006, it has already 
begun addressing any human rights viola-
tions. However, the agreement has gener-
ally failed to achieve its intended goals, 
including peace or wealth and power-shar-
ing for the Darfur region.
In its analysis, the Commission relied 
on its own precedent, precedent from the 
European Court of Human Rights, and 
UN and NGO reports to hold that the 
government of Sudan had violated Articles 
1, 4-7, 12(1), 14, 16, 18(1), and 22. The 
Commission made several important rec-
ommendations for the government of 
Sudan to remedy or address these viola-
tions, including to provide remedies for 
victims, investigate abuses, create the eco-
nomic and social infrastructure that would 
allow for the safe return for internally 
displaced persons and refugees, estab-
lish a National Reconciliation Forum to 
address the long-term sources of conflict, 
“undertake major reforms of its legislative 
and judicial framework,” and “desist from 
adopting amnesty laws for perpetrators for 
human rights abuses.”
The decision notably discusses Article 
22, the right to economic, social, and 
cultural (ESC) development, whose incor-
poration in the African Charter is unique 
among the regional systems. Article 22 
provides that
1. All peoples shall have the right 
to their economic, social and cul-
tural development with due regard 
to their freedom and identity and 
in the equal enjoyment of the com-
mon heritage of mankind. 2. States 
shall have the duty, individually or 
collectively, to ensure the exercise 
of the right to development.
The Commission found that the 
Darfurian people had been denied the 
opportunity to engage in ESC activities 
because of government-sponsored attacks 
and forced displacement, which violated 
their right to ESC development. Rather 
than further elaborate the substantive right 
to ESC development, the Commission 
focused on analyzing the necessary pre-
condition to qualify for this right under the 
Charter: designation or recognition as “a 
people,” since the right to ESC develop-
ment is one of the collective rather than 
individual rights recognized in the Charter. 
As in previous decisions, the Commission 
used the characteristics by which a people 
self identify, including “language, religion, 
culture . . . territory . . . history, [and] 
ethno-anthropological factors.” It also rec-
ognized that race and ethnicity can identify 
a people in a multi-racial state.
In recognizing Darfurians as a people, 
the Commission has increased their abil-
ity to claim other collective rights such as 
self-determination. In Katangese Peoples’ 
Congress v. Zaire, the Commission held that 
for a people to exercise the right to external 
self-determination, they must have suffered 
massive human rights violations. While the 
Commission has in the COHRE decision 
recognized both the Darfurians as a people 
and found the state responsible for massive 
human rights violations, it is unclear whether 
the Commission would hold in the future that 
Darfurians meet its high threshold for a right 
to self-determination through secession.
Sarira Sadeghi, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, wrote this 
column for the Human Rights Brief.
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colloQuiuM on aFrican HuMan 
rigHtS SySteM aiMS at neW era oF 
coMMunication and cooperation
Delegates from Africa’s principal judi-
cial and quasi-judicial human rights institu-
tions met in early October 2010 in Arusha, 
Tanzania to reflect on the ongoing evolu-
tion of mechanisms for the protection and 
promotion of human rights on the conti-
nent. Participants included the continental 
bodies — the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights — as 
well as some of the various sub-regional 
bodies authorized to adjudicate human 
rights issues, such as the East African 
Court of Justice (EACJ), the Tribunal 
of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), and the Court of 
Justice of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS).
The first of its kind in Africa, the 
Colloquium of African Human Rights 
Courts provided a crucial and heretofore 
absent forum in which the participants 
could deliberate and air common con-
cerns. In their Final Communiqué, the 
participants agreed, among other things, to 
hold colloquia every two years, evidencing 
that the various institutions have priori-
tized cooperative dialogue on procedural 
and substantive matters of joint interest. 
This commitment to close relations may 
assuage realistic fears that these human 
rights courts will come into conflict over 
jurisdiction or the interpretation of com-
mon human rights instruments, such as the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. It suggests these institutions recog-
nize that a unified, coherent jurisprudence 
is integral to the success of human rights 
imperative in Africa.
Of fundamental importance is the 
relationship between the two continental 
bodies, the African Commission and the 
African Court. As the preamble to its 
Protocol indicates, the African Court was 
founded to “complement and reinforce 
the functions of the African Commission” 
in furtherance of the Commission’s three 
mandates to promote, protect, and interpret 
human rights. The Protocol establishes in 
Article 5.1 the entities that may bring cases 
to the African Court, the first of which is 
the African Commission. While there are 
other possible entities — states, NGOs, 
and individuals — the Commission will 
likely be the main source of referrals in 
this formative stage of the Court’s evolu-
tion. States are not likely to bring cases 
against other states or against themselves, 
and NGOs and individuals can only have 
access to the Court if their home state has 
filed a special declaration granting permis-
sion. To date, only four states have issued 
such a declaration. Further emphasizing 
the Commission’s role as a gate-keeper, 
when cases are brought directly by NGOs 
or individuals, Article 6.1 of the Protocol 
outlines the Court’s right to request the 
opinion of the Commission on preliminary 
questions of admissibility. Given the com-
plementary and cooperative roles played 
by the two bodies, their respective rules 
of procedure ought to be harmonized to 
improve efficient and consistent outcomes 
for petitioners.
The relationship of the African Court 
to the various sub-regional courts also 
requires careful consideration. While their 
existence as able adjudicators and symbols 
of regional unity is integral to the suc-
cess of human rights initiatives in Africa, 
the sub-regional courts share a mandate 
similar to that of the African Court, and 
there is a resulting risk of overlapping 
subject matter jurisdiction. Discussions at 
the Colloquium primarily aimed to dimin-
ish concerns that these courts might issue 
differing or even conflicting interpretations 
of the relevant human rights instruments. 
The Danish Institute for Human Rights 
has suggested granting the African Court 
appellate authority to hear and interpret 
questions of law in cases adjudicated by 
the sub-regional bodies. The courts might 
also explore an arrangement whereby the 
sub-regional courts are permitted to refer 
questions of interpretation to the African 
Court, which would then issue an advisory 
opinion.
Given the complexity of Africa’s evolv-
ing human rights regime, achieving har-
mony among the various institutions will 
be a considerable and protracted undertak-
ing. There is hope that the Colloquium has 
both symbolically and substantively laid 
the foundation for this effort, and that the 
agreement to hold future colloquia marks 
the beginning of an enduring commitment 
to exchange agendas and working meth-
ods, experiences, and views of common 
issues. As the network evolves, however, 
the obstacle will likely not arise from a 
lack of will so much as a lack of funding 
and resources sufficient, for example, to 
facilitate in-person meetings or sustain 
an efficient, technologically modern com-
munication network. The Commission, for 
example, is highly dependent on support 
from various donors for its operations, and 
those donations are frequently earmarked 
for specific projects. Within this context, 
cooperation must not only be effective, 
but must also be able to adjust to whatever 
funds and resources are available.
Christopher Tansey, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of Law, 
covers the African regional and sub-regional 
systems for the Human Rights Brief.
european court oF HuMan rigHtS
european court oF HuMan rigHtS 
upHoldS turKiSH JournaliSt’S 
rigHt to FreedoM oF expreSSion
On September 14, 2010, in a unanimous 
Chamber decision upholding the right to 
freedom of expression, the European Court 
of Human Rights ruled that Turkish author-
ities violated Articles 2, 10, and 13 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
Dink v. Turkey examined the case of 
Firat Dink, a Turkish journalist of Armenian 
origin who was shot three times in the head 
in January 2007. The Court held that the 
Turkish State violated Article 2 for failing 
to protect Dink’s right to life and for inef-
fectively investigating his murder; Article 
10 for unjustly interfering with Dink’s 
right to freedom of expression; and Article 
13 for failing to effectively investigate the 
killing.
Dink, who took the pen name Hrant 
Dink, wrote frequently for a Turkish-
Armenian weekly newspaper about the 
plight of Turkish-Armenian citizens. He 
firmly believed that Turkish citizens of 
Armenian origin share a conflicted view 
of their own history. In a series of arti-
cles published between 2003 and 2004, 
Dink wrote that “Armenians’ obsession for 
Turkey to recognize their status as victims 
of genocide has become their raison d’être, 
but Turkey has treated this need with indif-
ference, and thus, the suffering of the 
Armenians remains an ongoing issue.” In 
Dink’s eighth article, while discussing the 
relationship between Turkish-Armenians 
and Turkish society as a whole, he wrote 
that “the purified blood that will replace 
the blood poisoned by the ‘Turk’ can be 
found in the noble vein linking Armenians 
to Armenia.”
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In context, the quote expressed how 
the Turkish-Armenian perception of the 
Turkish state had disintegrated to the point 
of poisoning their ability to interact with 
and engage in Turkish society. But the 
bravado of Dink’s rhetoric caught the atten-
tion of the Turkish government. In 2004, 
the public prosecutor brought criminal 
proceedings against Dink under article 301 
of the Turkish Criminal Code, which crimi-
nalizes the denigration of “Turkishness.” 
The Turkish court convicted Dink of deni-
grating Turkish identity, despite contextual 
evidence in his columns suggesting the 
contrary.
On February 17, 2006, during Dink’s 
appeals process within the Turkish court 
system, an informant alerted Turkish 
authorities to an assassination plot. The 
Istanbul police knew the names of poten-
tial suspects and yet did nothing, failing 
to alert Dink of any credible or imminent 
threat. Eleven months later, a 17-year-old 
Turkish extremist national shot Dink in 
the head.
That the Court upheld Dink’s right to 
freedom of expression even after his death 
is an important finding. After reviewing 
eight of his controversial articles, the Court 
found Dink’s use of “the impugned expres-
sion showed clearly that what he described 
as ‘poison’ had not been ‘Turkish blood,’ as 
held by the [Turkish] Court of Cassation, 
but the ‘perception of Turkish people’ 
by Armenians and the obsessive nature 
of the Armenian diaspora’s campaign to 
have Turkey recognise [sic] the events 
of the 1915 genocide.” The Court clari-
fied that, according to prior case law, the 
right to freedom of expression under the 
Convention can only be infringed under a 
three-part conjunctive test. Namely, if the 
infringement is prescribed by law, pursues 
a “legitimate aim,” and can be regarded 
as “necessary in a democratic society.” 
The Court focused its analysis on the third 
prong of the test and reiterated its posi-
tion that Article 10 “prohibit[s] restrictions 
on freedom of expression in the sphere 
of political debate and issues of public 
interest.” The Court further observed that 
Dink’s writings were in his capacity as 
a journalist, on an issue of public con-
cern. Lastly, the Court maintained that 
seeking historical truth is an “integral 
part of freedom of expression.” Balancing 
Dink’s interests against those of the State, 
the Court held that “Fırat Dink’s convic-
tion for denigrating Turkish identity had 
not answered any ‘pressing social need.’” 
Turkey had therefore violated Dink’s right 
to freedom of expression.
The Court ordered Turkey to pay Dink’s 
family approximately ć133,000 in non-
pecuniary damages and court costs. The 
Turkish State will not appeal the decision. 
Eighteen total suspects are still on trial in 
Turkey at the time of this writing, includ-
ing Ogün Samast, the main suspect in the 
assassination, who will be tried in juvenile 
court.
But the Turkish-Armenian citizens who 
so fervently supported Dink will feel vin-
dicated only if Turkey complies with the 
Court’s decree. The Turkish ministry said 
it would implement provisions of the judg-
ment and take measures to prevent similar 
violations in the future. If so, generations 
of Turkish journalists might finally know 
the true comforts of free speech, and not 
have to fear unjust prosecution. Then, Dink 
will achieve in martyrdom what he was just 
beginning to convey as editor-in-chief of 
Agos, the bilingual weekly newspaper that 
still features its former boss, relaxed and 
smiling, prominently on its website.
SudSidiarity and tHe european 
court: a Solution For non-
coMpliance?
The European Court of Human Rights 
risks drowning under a massive case 
load unless the national courts of EU 
member states and legislators show more 
respect for the Court’s judgments, said 
Christos Pourgourides, Chairperson of 
the Committee on Legal Affairs for the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE). In his speech, delivered 
October 1, 2010, in Skopje, Macedonia, 
Mr. Pourgourides called upon members of 
the European Council to adopt the idea of 
subsidiarity, a principle that requires the 
judicial systems of each member state to 
acknowledge the judgments of the Court. 
Such adherence would both enhance the 
notion of human rights and, over time, limit 
repetitive cases before the Court.
Pourgourides cited two egregious 
examples of repetition that could have 
been curbed through adherence to the sub-
sidiarity principle. In a 1979 case, Marckx 
v. Belgium, the Court held that children 
born out of wedlock must not be discrimi-
nated against, but such discrimination was 
not officially condemned in France until 
Mazurek v. France in 2000, when the Court 
upheld the inheritance rights of a man born 
out of wedlock. Also, in 1981 the Court 
held in Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom 
that homosexual acts between consent-
ing adults in the United Kingdom must 
not be criminalized, but these acts were 
not decriminalized in Cyprus until 1993, 
when the Court heard Modins v. Cyprus. 
In resisting Court precedent, the Cyprus 
government said its court acted before 
the implications of Dudgeon were prop-
erly understood. “Such practice is simply 
unacceptable if we agree that the common 
objective of all parties to the Convention, 
under its first article, is to ‘secure’ the 
rights and freedoms laid down in the 
[European Convention on Human Rights],” 
Pourgourides said in his speech.
Subsidiarity is an organizational belief 
that decisions are best made in the low-
est levels of government as opposed to at 
a supranational level. In this context of 
judicial organization, there is a reliance on 
each member state to uphold the judgments 
of the Court, so that similar claims from 
multiple jurisdictions will not be heard. 
Since the Treaty on the European Union 
established the principle of subsidiarity as 
a general rule in 1992, proponents such as 
Mr. Pourgourides have spoken to its value. 
His remarks were delivered at a confer-
ence called “Strengthening Subsidiarity 
– Integrating the Court’s Case-Law into 
National Law and Judicial Practice.” The 
aim of subsidiarity is not to restrict the 
power of the Court, but to make it more 
efficient. However, subsidiarity is not an 
immediate fix. Its practice would first 
require cooperation among all member 
states and generations of patience.
However, it is unlikely that subsidiar-
ity will completely solve the Court’s case 
overload. By most accounts, the Court’s 
pending caseload exceeds 100,000 applica-
tions and continues to grow. For example, 
the Court received more than 50,000 new 
applications in 2008, but rendered only 
30,000 admissibility decisions and less 
than 2,000 judgments. “Such a disparity 
is a double-edged sword for the Court,” 
said members of the International Law 
Discussion Group in a 2009 meeting at 
London’s Chatham House. The primary 
problem acknowledged during the meeting 
is that “many repetitive, but well-founded 
cases still go to Strasbourg when they 
should have been dealt with at the national 
level. The result is that Strasbourg has 
become the agent for effecting change in 
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society. This is both painful for the country 
concerned and crippling for the Court.”
Although Strasburg has become an 
agent for shaping societal change, some 
countries are not eager to integrate the 
Court’s judgments into their own case law 
because inaction is far easier. Moreover, 
the biggest hurdle in the implementation of 
subsidiarity is that even though the Court’s 
judgments can be reasonably described as 
“persuasive authority,” all parties of the 
Convention are not bound by its decisions 
and can easily hide behind the case-by-case 
nature of the Court.
Mr. Pourgourides has proposed some 
practical steps toward implementation. 
First, national legislatures and courts must 
be made aware of the Court’s case law 
through translations and comprehensive 
reviews in legal journals. Second, national 
parliaments must closely follow the evo-
lution of the Court’s case law. Third, the 
highest national courts must ensure lower 
courts are aware of and respect the Court’s 
case law. Fourth, dialogue between the 
Court and member states must be constant 
and facilitated by third parties. Fifth, mem-
ber states must learn more about key cases 
whose significance extends beyond the 
country that has been found in violation.
Whether Mr. Pourgourides’ suggestions 
bear fruit will not be known until long after 
he retires from his duties. He has, at least, 
outlined a starting point for success and 
perhaps the most substantive solutions to 
the Court’s most pressing threat.
Michael Becker, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
the European Court of Human Rights for the 
Human Rights Brief.
inter-aMerican SySteM
inter-aMerican court to Hear 
FirSt caSe on diScriMination baSed 
on Sexual orientation
On September 17, 2010, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) submitted the unprecedented 
case of Chilean judge Karen Atala to the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(Inter-American Court). In her petition, 
Atala alleges discrimination based on 
sexual orientation in the custody case of 
her children. The Chilean Supreme Court 
granted permanent custody to the chil-
dren’s father in 2004, following a com-
plaint he made after Atala moved in with 
her same-sex partner. He alleged that expo-
sure to Atala’s lifestyle caused the social, 
familial, and educational deterioration of 
their children. In granting the children’s 
father custody, the Chilean Supreme Court 
said that it based its decision on the best 
interest of the children. This is the first 
case of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation that the Inter-American Court 
will hear. A favorable result for Atala will 
address equal protection under the law 
for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) individuals and the rights of non-
traditional families.
In its Admissibility Report, the IACHR 
found that Atala had claims under the 
American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR) because of how the Chilean State 
(State) considered her sexual orientation 
in the custody proceedings. The IACHR 
found that Atala’s rights were violated 
under Article 24 of the ACHR, equal pro-
tection under the law; Article 11(2), right 
to privacy; and Article 17(1), the rights 
of the family. The IACHR also acknowl-
edged the potential violation of the rights 
of Atala’s children under Articles 19 and 
17(4) because the Chilean Supreme Court 
did not consider the children’s desire to 
stay with Atala. The IACHR referred the 
case to the Inter-American Court after it 
concluded that the State was responsible 
for violations of the ACHR, and had not 
complied with its recommendations for 
legislative and public policy reform on 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Chile defended its Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the best interests of the 
child before the IACHR, which included 
removing the children from a living situa-
tion that could contribute to “a risk to [the 
children’s’] development given the cur-
rent climate of Chilean society.” The State 
further argued that it did not discriminate 
against Atala based on sexual orientation, 
because its decision was not based on 
her relationship with her same-sex part-
ner. Rather, its decision was based on the 
effect of her same-sex cohabitation on her 
children.
Several civil society organizations sub-
mitted amicus curiae briefs in the proceed-
ings before the IACHR contesting the 
Chilean Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the best interests of the child. The New York 
City Bar Association’s amicus brief argued 
that the Court’s decision goes against the 
best interest of the children, because it 
“reinforce[s] derogatory stereotypes and 
place[s] a judicial seal of approval on the 
very homophobic prejudice that creates 
and fosters a hostile environment in the 
first instance.” The New York Bar’s amicus 
brief also cited cases in Argentina, Costa 
Rica and Brazil where domestic courts 
have protected the custody rights of gay 
and transgender parents and condemned 
discrimination based on sexual orientation 
in custody cases.
Chile’s domestic legal system is divided 
on the idea that homosexual parents “dete-
riorate” children who cohabitate with them. 
The Chilean State is defending a decision 
by its Supreme Court that is contrary to 
the findings of Chile’s own lower courts. 
In the Chilean Supreme Court itself, the 
decision was contentious, with a three 
to two division. A decision by the Inter-
American Court for Atala has the poten-
tial for impactful change within Chile. In 
response to a 2001 decision by the Inter-
American Court finding Chile in violation 
of the ACHR, Chile rewrote part of its 
Constitution. The Inter-American Court’s 
power to assign reparations could achieve 
similar legislative change.
Macarena Saez, a lawyer with Chilean 
legal organization Libertades Públicas 
A.G., represented Atala in front of the 
IACHR. She says that this case has already 
achieved something great for the LGBT 
community. “What makes history is what 
the Commission decides,” she said, “and 
the Commission has said that sexual orien-
tation is not grounds for discrimination.”
JuStice aFter 29 yearS:  
inter-aMerican court FindS 
guateMala reSponSible For Forced 
diSappearance oF Mayan leader
On May 25, 2010, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (Inter-American 
Court) held that Guatemala violated the 
human rights of Florencio Chitay Nech and 
his family through his forced disappearance 
and the displacement of his family dur-
ing the 1981 Guatemalan internal armed 
conflict. The Inter-American Court’s deci-
sion affirmed the State’s responsibility to 
investigate forced disappearances regard-
less of the passage of time, and applied 
the freedom of residence to indigenous 
children who were displaced due to threats 
of violence.
4
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol18/iss1/9
55
Chitay Nech was an indigenous 
Kaqchikel Maya, a farmer, and a co-op 
store owner. In 1973, he became politi-
cally active, and in 1977, he was elected as 
First Councilman (Deputy Mayor) of San 
Martín Jilotepeque in the Department of 
Chimaltenango. When the Mayor of San 
Martín Jilotepeque was disappeared in 
1980, Chitay Nech assumed his position. 
While Mayor, there were threats against 
Chitay Nech’s life and raids of his home. 
After the second raid, Chitay Nech fled 
to Guatemala City with his family. It was 
there, on April 1, 1981, that Chitay Nech 
was abducted in front of his five-year-old 
son, Estermerio. His whereabouts are still 
unknown.
Two months following the disappear-
ance, Chitay Nech’s family moved back to 
San Martín Jilotepeque, but their relatives 
refused to take them in for fear of govern-
ment reprisals. Chitay Nech’s family even-
tually separated out of necessity.
On the day that Chitay Nech disap-
peared, his wife, Marta Rodríguez Quex, 
reported the incident to the police. Three 
weeks after his disappearance it was publi-
cized by the media. Despite the reports, the 
Guatemalan police did not seriously assist 
the family in locating Chitay Nech. The 
Inter-American Court accepted the case, 
in part, because of the State’s failure to 
conduct an investigation into Chitay Nech’s 
forced disappearance.
The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR) urged the Inter-
American Court to find Guatemala respon-
sible for violations of Chitay Nech’s rights 
to judicial personality (Article 3), life 
(Article 4), humane treatment (Article 5), 
personal liberty (Article 7), and participa-
tion in government (Article 23) under the 
American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR). The IACHR further asserted that 
Guatemala violated Chitay Nech and his 
family’s rights to a fair trial (Article 8) and 
judicial protection (Article 25). They also 
alleged that Chitay Nech’s children’s right 
to humane treatment (Article 5) and the 
rights of the family (Article 17) were vio-
lated. Lastly, the IACHR cited violations 
of Articles I and II of the Inter-American 
Convention on Forced Disappearance of 
Persons (ICFDP).
The victim’s representatives introduced 
additional violations and extended the 
IACHR’s assertions to other affected par-
ties. Chitay Nech’s wife and sister-in-law 
were added to the list of family members 
against whom the violations were com-
mitted. They claimed violations of the 
right to property (Article 21) and the right 
to freedom of movement and residence 
(Article 22) of the ACHR. In response to 
the allegations, the State conceded viola-
tions of Articles 4, 5, 7, 17, 19 and 23 of 
the ACHR. However, the State continued 
to deny violating Articles 3, 8, 25 of the 
ACHR and objected to the addition of the 
alleged violations of Articles 21 and 22.
The Inter-American Court considered 
testimony and documented history in mak-
ing its decision about the State’s involve-
ment in Chitay Nech’s disappearance. 
Thirteen witnesses for the representatives 
testified about the circumstances of Chitay 
Nech’s disappearance and the use of forced 
disappearance against the Maya. One wit-
ness testified for the State on the effective-
ness of domestic remedies. Relying on this 
evidence, the Inter-American Court found 
the State responsible for the forced disap-
pearance of Chitay Nech.
Unlawful detention, lack of trial, 
prolonged isolation, and secret execu-
tion all constitute deprivations of human 
rights inherent to forced disappearances. 
Guatemala also denied Chitay Nech’s 
political freedoms by causing his forced 
disappearance. These violations were com-
pounded by his status as an elected official. 
The State not only infringed on Chitay 
Nech’s political rights, but the political 
rights of the community to elect him as an 
official. The Inter-American Court found 
the State violated the right to political 
participation (Article 23(1)(a)) for these 
reasons.
The Inter-American Court also ruled 
that when the State failed to investigate 
Chitay Nech’s disappearance, it violated 
his children’s rights to a fair trial and judi-
cial protection under articles 8(1) and 25(1) 
under the ACHR and Article 1(b) under the 
ICFDP. Through the forced displacement 
of the family, the State also violated the 
children’s right to residence, movement, 
and protection of the family under Articles 
22 and 17, and the minor children’s access 
to cultural life under Article 19. The Inter-
American Court emphasized that the cul-
tural loss of the family’s Mayan heritage 
contributed to the cruelty of their displace-
ment.
The Inter-American Court ordered the 
State to make reparations, including mone-
tary compensation, to Chitay Nech and his 
family within a year of the decision. The 
Inter-American Court also required the 
State to notify the citizens of Guatemala 
of the Inter-American Court’s judgment 
through newspaper articles and radio-
broadcasts. Additionally, the Court ordered 
Guatemala to begin an investigation to 
find and punish the responsible parties for 
Chitay Nech’s disappearance, to search for 
Chitay Nech, to name a street after him, 
and to offer psychological and psychiatric 
assistance to the family if desired.
In applying Article 22’s right to free-
dom of residence to the children displaced 
by threats of violence, the Inter-American 
Court extended its application beyond 
previous boundaries. They acknowledged 
that the freedom of residence is violated 
when a family is displaced by attempting 
to escape threatened violence. This deci-
sion additionally reiterated the obligation 
of Guatemala to investigate and compen-
sate people whose family members have 
been forcibly disappeared, regardless of the 
amount of time passed since their disap-
pearance.
EmilyRose Johns, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of Law, 
covers the Inter-American System for the Human 
Rights Brief.
inter-aMerican court ruleS in 
Favor oF paraguayan indigenouS 
group in land rigHtS caSe
The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (Court) decided its third Paraguayan 
indigenous peoples’ land rights case on 
August 24, 2010, holding that a portion 
of the ancestral lands of the Xákmok 
Kásek Indigenous Community should be 
returned. Notably, the Court recognized 
not only that Article 21 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) 
protects the indigenous group’s communal 
land claim, but also that the community 
has a right to reclaim specific ancestral 
lands because of their historical, cultural, 
and spiritual significance to the indigenous 
group.
The Xákmok Kásek people are a multi-
ethnic community of fewer than 300 indi-
viduals from Enxet, Sanapaná, and other 
ethnic groups who seek to regain 10,700 
hectares of land within the Paraguayan 
Chaco. The claimed land, part of which 
has been declared a protected area by 
the Paraguayan government, is currently 
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occupied by a privately owned farm in 
the northwestern department of Presidente 
Hayes. The creation of the protected area 
further curtailed the nomadic and tradi-
tionally self-sufficient way of life of the 
Xákmok Kásek and forced many members 
of the community to seek employment on 
private farms.
The Xákmok Kásek community has 
attempted to reclaim its rights to these 
ancestral lands since 1986 and first filed 
a complaint with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
in 2001. The IACHR found that the 
Paraguayan government was not meet-
ing its international obligations under the 
American Convention, in particular with 
respect to the rights to property and life. 
After the Paraguayan government failed to 
comply with the IACHR’s recommenda-
tions, it submitted the case to the Inter-
American Court for adjudication in July 
2009.
The IACHR submitted that Paraguay 
was obligated to recognize the Xákmok 
Kásek’s ancestral land claim even if the 
State did not have possession of the land 
because it was privately owned. Tierraviva, 
a non-governmental organization rep-
resenting the victims, alleged that the 
Xákmok Kásek’s lack of land ownership 
severely limits the community’s traditional 
means of subsistence, which is based on its 
nomadic lifestyle. In response, Paraguay 
claimed that it had diligently attempted 
to enable the Xákmok Kásek people to 
exercise their right to land, pointing to 
legislation granting indigenous communi-
ties access to land and to successful land 
reclamation achieved by other indigenous 
groups. Although Paraguay also main-
tained that the community’s claim could be 
satisfied by granting alternate traditional 
lands, the Court found that Paraguay had 
not actually identified suitable and avail-
able land. Noting that it had provided 
medical and sanitation services as well as 
food assistance, Paraguay also rejected the 
notion that it could be found liable for the 
deaths of the Xákmok Kásek community 
members.
In its recent ruling, the Court found 
that Paraguay violated the Xákmok Kásek 
indigenous community’s rights under the 
ACHR, such as the right to life (Article 4), 
property (Article 21), humane treatment 
(Article 5), legal access and protection 
(Articles 8 and 25), and juridical personal-
ity (Article 3), in particular with respect 
to documentation of identity. Additionally, 
the Court found that the rights of the child 
(Article 19) and the right to non-discrim-
ination (Article 1) had been violated. In 
its judgment, the Court ordered Paraguay 
to return, by August 2013, the 10,700 
hectares claimed by the Xákmok Kásek 
or to identify another suitable site within 
the group’s traditional lands. The judgment 
also requested the State to hold a public 
ceremony internationally recognizing the 
harm suffered by the Xákmok Kásek com-
munity. The ruling identified the failings of 
Paraguayan legislation in resolving indig-
enous land claims, particularly when indig-
enous rights to traditional land conflict 
with private property ownership rights. The 
ruling advised the Paraguayan government 
to revise its legislation or administrative 
system so it can address indigenous land 
claims successfully and efficiently in the 
future. Additionally, the Court urged the 
Paraguayan government to immediately 
provide medical, psychosocial, and sani-
tation services to the community, as well 
as adequate food, clean water, and educa-
tional resources. Lastly, the Court asked 
the Paraguayan government to designate 
specialists to conduct a needs assessment 
with respect to the community’s basic 
necessities by February 2011.
The Court’s ruling is an achievement 
not only for the Xákmok Kásek but also 
for the country’s indigenous population 
as a whole. The ruling publicly recog-
nizes both the right to communal property 
for the country’s indigenous groups and 
the immense need for improved services 
and resources for a population historically 
underserved and marginalized. The Court’s 
recommendations, if fulfilled, will signify 
Paraguay’s recognition of the harm to its 
indigenous populations and will lead to 
enhanced protection of their basic human 
rights.
inter-aMerican court HoldS tHat 
Mexico violated tHe HuMan rigHtS 
oF tWo WoMen raped by Mexican 
Military perSonnel
The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (Court) decided two rape cases 
in August 2010 brought by indigenous 
women against Mexico. In Cantú and 
Ortega, the Court held that two women 
raped by Mexican soldiers were denied 
access to justice when their cases were 
placed under military jurisdiction and not 
adequately investigated by either civilian 
or military authorities. The Court found 
Mexico in violation of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the 
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture (Convention on Torture), 
and the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication 
of Violence against Women (Convention 
on Violence against Women). The Court 
concluded that the Mexican military justice 
system is inherently unsuited to investigate 
human rights violations allegedly perpe-
trated by members of the Armed Forces.
The women, both members of the 
Me’phaa (Tlapanec) indigenous group, 
faced similar difficulties following their 
rapes. Neither woman received timely and 
adequate medical treatment following her 
ordeal. Cantú was initially refused services 
because of the doctor’s alleged fear of 
military retaliation and a lack of proper 
medical equipment. Ortega was not pro-
vided medical treatment until the day fol-
lowing her rape because there was no 
female physician available to examine her. 
Neither woman was given a psychological 
evaluation. Cantú, only seventeen at the 
time of her rape, was left by her husband 
and outcast by her community such that 
she was forced to relocate to another town. 
Ortega and her family were repeatedly 
threatened and attacked, and her brother 
was murdered for his support and advocacy 
on her behalf.
Ortega’s initial attempt to report her 
case was denied because it implicated the 
military. It took more than two months for 
the Public Prosecution Service to determine 
which office had jurisdiction over Cantú’s 
case. Both cases were eventually trans-
ferred from the local Public Prosecution 
Service to the Military Prosecution Service 
despite appeals by the women for their 
cases to remain in the civilian system. After 
more than a year of inaction, the victims 
filed petitions with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
with the help of several civil society orga-
nizations.
The IACHR held that Mexico violated 
the women’s rights to non-discrimination, 
humane treatment, privacy, and juridical 
protection and as a result, made several 
recommendations to Mexico. After the 
government failed to comply with the 
recommendations, the IACHR submitted 
the cases of Ortega and Cantú to the Court 
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for adjudication in May and August 2009, 
respectively. The IACHR’s application 
to the Court highlighted that the State’s 
failure to investigate the victims’ claims 
without unnecessary delays and bring the 
perpetrators to justice was rooted in racial 
and gender discrimination. Moreover, the 
IACHR posited that allowing cases where 
both the investigators and the defendants 
are members of the same security force 
leads to partiality and impunity, which is 
more pronounced in a system that lacks 
competence in dealing with issues of sex-
ual violence.
In its rulings, the Court found that 
Mexico violated the victims’ rights to non-
discrimination, humane treatment, legal 
protection, and privacy, Articles 1, 5, 8, 
11, and 25 of the ACHR. The Court also 
found that Mexico had failed to meet its 
obligation to investigate and prosecute 
cases of torture under Articles 1, 2, and 6 
of the Convention on Torture. Additionally, 
it found that Mexico had violated Article 
7 of the Convention on Violence against 
Women by failing to take adequate steps 
to prevent, investigate, and punish violence 
against women. Finally, the Court found 
that Cantú’s right to special protection as a 
minor was violated under Article 19 of the 
ACHR. The Court ordered Mexico to pay 
$171,000 in reparations to Ortega and her 
family members and $147,000 to Cantú. 
It also ordered Mexico to investigate the 
rapes of both women with due diligence, 
to reform the Code of Military Justice 
limiting the scope of military jurisdiction 
in cases of civilian human rights’ abuses, 
and to allocate resources and establish 
mechanisms of prevention and protection 
for indigenous women and girls, amongst 
other measures.
The Court’s rulings indicate the Inter-
American system’s growing focus on 
eliminating impunity within the Mexican 
military and the lack of transparency in the 
military justice system. The ruling mirrors 
a 2001 verdict where the Court found that 
Mexico had likewise failed to conduct a 
thorough, impartial, and civilian investiga-
tion of the rape of three indigenous sisters 
by military personnel. These rulings sig-
nify the Court’s recognition of the special 
vulnerability of indigenous communities 
in militarized zones and the need to imple-
ment safeguards to mitigate the harmful 
effects of military presence and improve 
access to assistance and justice, especially 
for women. Finally, the Court’s rulings 
highlight the continued shortcomings of 
the Mexican institutions involved in cases 
of human rights violations perpetrated 
against indigenous women, from failures to 
provide culturally and linguistically com-
petent service provision to victims to coor-
dination amongst investigative and judi-
cial agencies to adequately address sexual 
abuse cases without re-victimization.
Carson Osberg, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
the Inter-American System for the Human Rights 
Brief.  HRB
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